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Today, falling trends of species and ecosystem in the world due to
overconsumption and destruction of natural resources are at critical
levels. It is vital for humanity to operate with sustainable and resilient
modes of production and consumption. In this regard, this paper
examines the basic premise of rationality and introduces sustainability as
an advancement to the theoretical concept of rationality. Thus, a rational
mindset and a sustainable mindset are compared under depletion of
environmental resources. The understanding of rationality in the analysis
is based on Garett Hardin’s (1968) ‘the tragedy of the commons’ model,
in which actors are self-interested and individualistic while seeking
resources. Conversely, a sustainable mindset acknowledges environmental
limitations and takes action accordingly. By utilizing agent-based
modeling, both rational and sustainable mindsets are modeled, and their
relative behavior are put into action in computer simulation. The results
reveal that the basic understanding of rationality is not always going
to maximize the utility of agents. Instead, there may be environmental
conditions where having a sustainable mindset generates more wealth.
In a scenario of resource depletion, the chances of survival decrease for
rational agents. Their situation is exacerbated if their level of greed
increases. However, the sustainable agents continue making stable wealth
even with limited environmental resources. Rational actors must develop
a sustainable mindset in order to acclimatize themselves to environmental
deterioration.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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Introduction

O

ne of the most alarming global challenges faced today is environmental
damage and destruction all across the world due to human
overconsumption and exploitation of natural resources. Ecosystems and
biodiversity including animal species are increasingly affected by pressures
from unsustainable agriculture, fisheries, mining and other human activities
that contribute to habitat loss, degradation, overexploitation, climate change
and pollution. For example, between 1970 and 2013, the population of the
world’s wild animals decreased 58 percent.1 According to the Ecological
Footprint assessments, a measure of the relationship between human behavior
and the Earth’s resource capacity, the regenerative capacity of the Earth is
not sufficient to accommodate the current human demand. Currently, the
capacity of at least 1.6 planet Earths is needed to meet the goods and services
of human consumption each year.2 In this day and age, “the global population
is cutting down trees faster than they regrow, catching fish faster than the
oceans can restock, pumping water from rivers and aquifers faster than rainfall
can replenish them and emitting more climate-warming carbon dioxide than
oceans and forests can absorb.”3 The overconsumption of Earth’s renewable
resources threatens the environmental systems and the future of humanity.
Current economic systems, governance practices, as well as the social
values of consumerist societies are driving humanity to an unsustainable
future. “Structural elements of these systems such as the use of gross domestic
product (GDP) as a measure of well-being, the pursuit of infinite economic
growth on a finite planet, the prevalence of short-term gain over long-term
continuity in many business and political models, and the externalization
of ecological and social costs in the current economic system encourage
unsustainable choices by individuals, businesses and governments.”4
However, protecting the planet’s natural capital and its ecosystem is in
people’s primary interest. With a weak or destroyed natural environment,
it will not be possible for humanity to create a fair and a prosperous future,
conquer poverty and improve health. Significant changes must take place
within the global economic system in order to inculcate a vision that the
Earth has limited resources. Research advocates “changing the way we
measure success, managing natural resources sustainably, and taking future
generations and the value of nature into account in decision-making.”5 It is
critical for humanity to operate within sustainable limits of production and
consumption. To prevent further degradation of the environment a mindset
must be developed that comprehends resource boundaries and promotes a
sustainable way of life for the future.
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This paper explores the consequences of environmental factors in
decision-making modeling. The purpose is to demonstrate how different
ways of thinking become important under scarce resources. By utilizing
agent-based modeling and an artificial behavioral space, the performances of
rational and sustainable mindsets are compared under various environmental
conditions. Variations in behavior are tested in a simulation environment in
which different factors can be manipulated and experimented. The agentbased models that are designed in this study use the simulation software
NetLogo 6.0.6 Overall, the findings suggest that agents who acknowledge
the limitations of environmental resources and act accordingly benefit over
agents who are self-interested and individualistic.

Theoretical Framework
Rationality is the leading concept of most decision-making models.
Classic economic theory, modern decision theory and game theory all utilize
the concept of rationality. According to Sidney Verba, a rational actor makes
a “cool and clearheaded ends-means calculation” after considering all possible
courses of action and attentively weighing the advantages and disadvantages of
each of them.7 Modern formal decision theory and game theory suggest that
optimal choices arise out of compelling and systematically defined situations.
In these situations, rationality alludes to consistent utility-maximizing
computation or adjustment to specific impediments. From the perspective of
economics, a rational actor would select the most efficient alternative, which
maximizes output compared to input, or minimizes input considering output.
For instance, among different goods, a rational consumer chooses the one
that will create maximum usefulness or advantages with the lowest cost. In
modern decision theory, rational decision-making is about choosing among
certain alternatives with each one having a particular set of consequences.
The agent ranks each of the consequences in terms of its benefits and chooses
the preferred alternative. If the consequences are unclear, the decision maker
chooses an alternative that has the greatest utility expected. Game theory
applies the same logic of utility maximization but additionally emphasizes
how one actor’s best choice can be dependent on another’s.8
While many theories in different academic disciplines use the concept
of rationality, there is hardly any consensus on the specifications of the
concept. There are various perceptions and conceptualizations of rationality
emphasizing distinct dimensions and thus various methodological tools to
attain it. For instance, procedural rationality identifies the concept with
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“omniscience.”9 It is assumed that an actor knows the consequences of all his
actions precisely, and he has clearly defined preferences. Procedural rationality
also assumes that an actor correctly judges the preferences of other relevant
actors and their possible response to his strategic choices. According to this
view, rationality excludes misconceptions or flaws of human cognition, and
omits emotional or psychological shortcomings.10 On the other hand, those
who define rationality instrumentally, provide a more limited view of the
concept. According to instrumental rationality, a rational actor will choose
the option that produces the more preferred result when faced with two
alternatives. Instrumental rationality relies on two assumptions: connectivity
and transitivity. Connectivity implies that an actor has the ability to compare
achievable outcomes and logically evaluate them. Transitivity means that
if a player chooses option a to b, and b to c, then he will choose a to c.
Assumptions of instrumental rationality are useful for constructing theories
of rational or psychological choice.11
Contrary to the classic economic perspective of rationality, Herbert
Simon proposes bounded rationality highlighting the limitations of
individuals’ decision-making. Simon outlines the assumptions of traditional
economic theory concerning a rational economic agent as the use of complete
information, having a well-organized and a stable preference system and the
ability to calculate utility for every alternative. However, according to Simon,
individuals do not seek to maximize their interests through a specific pathway.
He points out that individuals do not have access to all the information
needed. Besides, even if they had full access, their cognitive capacity and time
availability are not going to let them digest and process all that information.
Therefore, Simon suggests approximate rational behavior to account for
actual access to information and actual computational capacities. Rather than
finding the optimal choices, decision-makers seek satisfactory solutions.12
These different theoretical perspectives express the dynamic concept of
rationality and the robust nature of the academic dialogue surrounding this
concept. The concept of rationality can become even more complex when
environmental factors are added into the picture. Garett Hardin is one of the
first scholars demonstrating how rational actors can end up in suboptimal
outcomes in to environmental settings. Hardin came up with the expression
“the tragedy of the commons” modeling the anticipation of environmental
degradation whenever a scarce resource is in use by many individuals
collectively. Hardin explains his model with the example of a pasture open to
everyone. The logical structure is portrayed from the perspective of rational
herdsmen. According to Hardin’s illustration, each herder benefits from using
the pasture. Being rational, it is expected that each herdsman will try to have
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as many cattle as possible on the pasture to maximize their gain. Herdsmen
question the utility that is going to be gained as a result of adding one more
animal to their herd. The positive side is all the earnings from the additional
animal; thus the +1 utility. In contrast, the negative side is overgrazing due
to adding one more animal. Rather than bearing the full negative utility
individually, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen. Hence,
the negative utility for each herdsman is a portion of -1. Because negative utility
is distributed equitably among the herdsmen rather than being experienced
individually, each and every rational herdsman sharing this commons would
have this same decision-making calculus – adding more and more animals
to their herds. As a result, the “tragedy” occurs.13 “Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is
limited.”14 When each man pursues his own interest on a commons without
regard for others, destruction ensues and eventually brings downfall to all.15
Hardin’s model is important in terms of portraying the dichotomy between
overconsumption and scarce resources.
Scholar Richard Campbell also drew attention to rationality’s theoretical
paradox. The prisoner’s dilemma game reveals how rational individual
strategies can lead to collectively irrational results. According to the game,
two men, A and B, are held separately by the police charged with a joint
crime. The prosecutor offers a deal to the prisoners who are in separate cells
and unable to communicate with each other. Each prisoner is told that even
if they don’t confess, there is enough evidence to incarcerate them for a year.
If one confesses and the other does not, the former will go free but and his
silent accomplice will be sentenced for ten years. If both confess their crime,
each one will be sentenced for nine years. The circumstances for the prisoners
are summarized in Table 1.
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From the perspective of prisoner A, prisoner B has two possible
alternatives; he is either going to confess or not. Either way, if A is rational,
he would confess in order to get fewer years. If prisoner B confesses, then
confessing will be better for A. If B does not confess, it is again better for A
to confess – serving no jail time. The same reasoning applies to prisoner B
as well. Consequently, if both A and B are rational, they will both confess
and end up serving nine years in jail. Therefore, the prisoner’s dilemma game
portrays how rational human beings can achieve irrational outcomes.16
Similarly, Mancur Olson depicts, in The Logic of Collective Action, how
individuals fail to pursue their joint welfare. Olson challenges the general idea
that when acting on behalf of their common interests, groups of individuals
are expected to act for the common interests like single individuals would
have acted for their personal interests. Previous research argued that a group
of rational and self-interested actors would act collectively if they have a
common interest or objective, which is going to make all of them better off.
However, Olson claims that the proposition that groups will act on their
self-interest due to their rational and self-interested behavior is actually not
correct.17 In fact, “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small,
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals
act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act
to achieve their common or group interests.”18 Consequently, when members
of a large group try to maximize their personal welfare rationally, they will
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not act to promote their common or group objectives unless there are other
factors such as coercion.
Olson points out the role of organizations as a means to attain common
or group interests. Organizations can execute a function when there are
common or group interests – sharing a single purpose or objective. Even
though organizations frequently attend to personal interests, their essential
quality and core function is to further the common interests of groups of
individuals. Individual, unorganized action won’t be able to further that
common interest, or it won’t be able to further it sufficiently.19
Elinor Ostrom brought a new perspective to the tragedy of the commons,
the prisoner’s dilemma and the logic of collective action, which all depict how
rational individuals can create irrational outcomes. All of these models portray
how people jointly use a resource in a natural setting and how individuals jointly
produce a suboptimal result. Ostrom advanced scholarship on rationality by
applying methodological individualism to comprehend cooperative behavior
and institutions.20 She brought a new collective action dimension to Hardin’s
argument in “The Tragedy of the Commons” notwithstanding rational choice
individualism.21 Ostrom argues that through institutions in which there is
shared behavior and egotistical individualism is regulated, commons can
be governed. In order to prevent the destruction of natural resources, some
scholars have historically recommended state control and some suggested the
privatization of those resources. However, Ostrom asserts that “neither the
state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain
long-term, productive use of natural systems.”22 Instead, communities of
individuals constructed institutions, dissimilar to the state or to the market,
to manage resource systems with certain level of success over time.23
Rational and egotistical individual actions in pursuit of maximizing
self-interest can be regulated under institutions as the shared decisions and
behaviors.24 This perspective sees institutions as rules, norms and designed
constraints, which organize social, political, and economic interactions.25
According to Ostrom, rules are important in terms of decreasing the
uncertainty that is caused by the unpredictable behavior of individuals and
resource systems:
In all cases in which individuals have organized themselves to solve CPR
[common-pool resource, such as inshore fisheries, communal forests, smaller
grazing areas, groundwater basins, and irrigation systems] problems, rules have
been established by the appropriators that have severely constrained the authorized
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actions available to them. Such rules specify, for example, how many resource units
an individual can appropriate, when, where and how they can be appropriated,
and the amounts of labor, materials, or money that must be contributed to various
provisioning activities. If everyone, or almost everyone, follows these rules, resource
units will be allocated more predictably and efficiently, conflict levels will be reduced,
and the resource system itself will be sustained over time.26

Ostrom’s core argument is that individuals are more likely to generate
and preserve the commons when they have feasible and dependable
information, which is crucial in terms of working out the costs and benefits
of resource decisions, and when they have opportunities to set the rules of
the scheme.27 Thus, Ostrom theorizes on self-organizing and self-governing
forms of collective action. Unlike Hardin28, Ostrom argues the tragedy of
the commons is not the inevitable result for every resource. The outcome
of resources depends “on the existence of institutions governing access,
utilization, management, exclusion, ownership and transfer of ownership.”29
Consequently, despite the popularity of individualistic economic thinking,
Ostrom proposed a vision of cooperative behavior which does not depend on
a centralized state.

Modeling
Agent-based models are composed of agents that interact within
an environment. Agents can be independent computer programs or
separate parts of a program representing social actors, such as individuals,
organizations, firms, or nation-states. Agents are programmed to respond to
the computational environment, which is to simulate the behavior of social
actors in real environment. Agent-based simulation offers the possibility to
represent people’s decision rules.30 In agent-based modeling terminology,
decision rules are the algorithms of the agents that let their interaction with
each other and with the environment. The way people think or their logic is
reflected in agent-based modeling as decision rules. As a mean to simulate the
behavior of social actors in a real environment, the decision rules should be
explicitly defined in the models.
In this study, the agents’ decision rules rely on two assumptions. The
first assumption applies rationality on resource utilization based on the
calculations of actors in Garett Hardin’s the tragedy of the commons model.31
According to this model, rational actors would not hesitate to consume the
resources of the commons for their individual interests. Therefore, when
rationality is the primary driver of an actor, it is expected that this person
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would utilize the resources in its environment to increase its wealth as much
as possible. It is difficult to portray an abstract concept like rationality in a
concrete way, especially in an artificial environment. Therefore, ‘generating
wealth via resource usage’ is employed as a basic indication of one’s rational
mindset:
The higher the level of rationality of an actor, the more it will obtain the resources
in the environment to maximize its utility. The lower the rationality of an actor, the
less it will extract the resources around to maximize its wealth.

The second assumption points out a particular mindset that can be
presented as an additional dimension to the basic notion of rationality. The
purpose is to identify a mindset that is going to advance rationality’s selfinterest seeking individualistic premise.
Thus, this analysis takes ‘sustainable mindset’ as a factor that can be tested
against the first assumption. People with a sustainable mindset are aware of
environmental trends including diminished biodiversity and degradation of
ecosystems in the world. Hence, they choose a way of life that avoids the
overuse of resources. In other words, people with sustainable mindsets limit
their resource consumptions according to Earth’s environmental capacity.
The more the sustainable an actor is, the more it will restrain from conserving
resources to maximize its utility in the long-term. The less the sustainable an actor is,
the more it will disregard conserving the natural resources for the sake of maximizing
its immediate interests.

The analysis in this study focuses only on the aspects of the rational
and sustainable mindsets addressed in the assumptions. Rationality
and sustainability are abstract concepts with many different layers and
facets. However, to run an experiment on these mindsets and observe the
consequences, certain aspects of these systems have to be isolated. Agentbased modeling and virtual simulations help us peel off the layers of these
mindsets and overcome difficulties of isolating abstract human systems.
Thus, agent-based modeling is utilized as a computational method to test the
behavioral consequences of the rational and the sustainable mindsets.
The basic connection of the rational and the sustainable mindset with
resource extraction is simulated in NetLogo through various models. The
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analysis avails several models as a means to capture the behavioral pattern
of rationality in realistic terms. Starting from the most basic and ending
with the most advanced, the models will be presented one by one to explain
how different dimensions of rationality are addressed. The models used in
this study utilized the codes of Sugarscape and Wealth Distribution models,
which can be reached from the Models Library of NetLogo.32

Model Development & Testing
Model development and testing of this study is conducted hand in hand.
The core behavioral principles are tested on various models. Testing procedure
is applied not only in terms of portraying the intended behavior in the best
way, but also in terms of introducing new variables to make the model as
similar as possible to real-life scenarios.
The analysis starts with the Basic Rationality Model, which is depicted in
Figure 1. The NetLogo codes of all the models in this study can be found in
Appendix I to replicate and trace. The left-hand side picture is a screenshot
of the simulation before it was launched. The simulation begins with random
distribution of resources and agents. The left picture in Figure 1 shows the
randomly created red agents and the green resource mountains in the artificial
simulation environment. The most basic variable that is used in the model is
‘rationality’. Every agent is created with a random score of rationality from 1
to 10. The behavioral rule of the agents is to go to the resource mountains and
to extract resources according to their levels of rationality:
The higher the level of rationality of an agent (turtle), the more it will extract
from the green resource mountains (patches).

For instance, when all the other variables are held constant, an agent with
a rationality score 8 extracts resources faster than a level 4 agent. The resources
that are extracted by the agents become their wealth to keep. For example, an
agent with a rationality score 2 accumulates wealth slower than an agent with
a score of 6 (assuming all the other variables in the model are held constant).
Therefore, it is expected that agents with higher level of rationality would
extract more resources and in return accumulate more wealth.
Once the simulation is set into motion, the agents start generating wealth
depending on their level of rationality. It is expected that the agents with
higher levels of rationality collect wealth faster than the ones with lower
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levels. After running the model for some time, the simulation generates
three agent types in terms of their level of wealth as it can be seen from the
right-hand side picture of Figure 1. The red agents represent the lowest level
of wealth generated, and then the green agents represent medium level of
wealth. Lastly, the highest wealth level compared to the wealth generated by
the other agents is represented with blue agents. Figure 2 depicts samples,
one from each of these agent types. For instance, the left-hand side picture
provides information for turtle 67, which is the blue agent in the center of
the left-hand side display. When compared with the information of turtle
171 and turtle 168, turtle 67 has generated much more wealth. Turtle 67’s
level of rationality is 9, which is followed by turtle 168 with a rationality score
8 and turtle 171 with level of rationality 4. Therefore, there is a relationship
between the agents’ level of rationality and the amount of wealth that they
generated.
However, random factors are also included into the modeling that would
prevent the relationship between rationality and wealth generation to be
absolute. Besides the level of rationality, the agents have random levels of
vision and metabolism. The vision defines how many grids away an agent can
see in the virtual environment. Therefore, agents with a higher level of vision
have a higher chance to locate resource rich spots. Additionally, agents have
random metabolism levels. At every move, agents have to burn some level
of wealth. Agents with higher level of metabolism are burning more wealth
compared to the others. Therefore, the lower the level of metabolism, the
higher the probability to survive and to accumulate wealth. Furthermore,
the location where the agent is created at the beginning of the simulation
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is crucial. As it is mentioned earlier, when the model is set up, the agents
are randomly distributed on the simulation environment. Some of them are
created on the resource mountains or close to them, but some of the agents
fall far away from the resources. The agents that are created away from the
resources are going to be disadvantaged, and they are less likely to surpass the
wealth levels of the ones that were created on the resources. Thus, vision,
metabolism, and location represent random factors that can influence the
basic functioning principle of the model. As a result, due to these random
factors, not all agents with high levels of rationality will be able to collect
relatively high levels of wealth. Similarly, because of these random factors,
some of the agents with low levels of rationality will be able to collect more
wealth than expected.
By adding new variables and behavioral patterns the representation of
the models are strengthened. The second model in the analysis introduces
one more breed of agents – in the Two Breed Model. The Basic Rationality
Model portrayed the fundamental logic of rationality. However, this
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foundational model needs to be developed with new variables and concepts.
Therefore, in addition to the rational mindset, the Two Breed Model depicts
the sustainable mentality. By making additions to the basic model the core
functioning principle of the model is being tested as well. Because when
new variables or behavior patterns are introduced in the model, the core
mechanism and functioning principle should be able to accommodate this
situation. Furthermore, testing and model development increase the capacity
of the model to capture real phenomena.
In the Two Breed Model, rationality scale is divided into two. Agents that
are randomly scored from 1 to 5 are called sustainables; on the other hand,
agents that have rationality scores between 6 to 10 are called rationals. The
rationality scores of rationals are higher than sustainables to reflect their desire
to extract resources for the sake of their immediate interests. The rationality
score of sustainables is lower to depict how they curb their consumption to
maximize long-term gains. Sustainables are represented by green and rationals
are represented by red color.
As it can be seen from Figure 3, by utilizing the sliders on the lefthand side of the simulation screen, certain parameters in the model can be
manipulated. For example, the first two sliders, which are initial-sustainables
and initial-rationals, are designed to control the population of the agents.
Additionally, agents’ movement can be manipulated via the sliders rationalsmove and sustainables-move. The sliders related to movement are useful in
terms of comparing the activity and the mobility levels of different breeds.
Furthermore, the resource quantity can be manipulated through percentbest-land and num-resource-grown. More specifically, percent-best-land
slider is for changing the resource richness in the environment – the higher
the percent-best-land, the more abundant the resources in the simulation
environment. On the other hand, num-resource-grown operates the growth
or regeneration level of the resources after being consumed by the agents – the
lower the num-resource-grown, the more time it takes to restore the resources
in the simulation environment. The plot view shows the mean wealth of the
breeds. Underneath the plot screen there are two monitors displaying the
mean calculations of sustainables and rationals.
Model controls are critical to simulating real life phenomena. For
example, take a communal forest and woodsmen who make living from
this natural resource. The woodsmen in this environment are composed of
individuals with rational or sustainable mindsets each to varying degrees.
The woodsmen population can be controlled through the sliders of initialsustainables and initial-rationals (Figure 3). Their activity in the forest can
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be managed by the sliders of rationals-move and sustainables-move. Forest
vegetation density can be manipulated by percent-best-land. The regrowth
rate of the forest after being cut down can be controlled by num-resourcegrown. These controls can be applied to other common-pooled resources like
fisheries, grazing lands, irrigation systems or groundwater basins.
The Two Breed Model clearly demonstrates the wealth difference between
sustainables and rationals. With the assumption of constant grow-back in
resources, the rational agents accumulate more resources than sustainable
agents – the more the simulation is run, the more the wealth gap opens
between the two breeds. Even if the movement frequency of rationals is
decreased and sustainables’ increased, rational agents generate more wealth
due to their will to extract resources faster (assuming the resource level is
constant). The mean wealth of sustainables can catch rationals’ (Figure 4)
only when the movement of sustainables is increased to above 90% levels and
movement of rationals is stopped (only extracting resources from where they
are), and the resource growback level (num-resource-grown) is minimized to
level 1. In other words, the wealth gap between the two breeds can only be
closed if rationals stop seeking out resources and only extract from where they
are while sustainables increase their activity level to find resources.

Model development and testing continues with introducing new
behavioral patterns. After presenting the second breed, further experimentation
was conducted to reflect behavioral patterns of people or societies. In the
third model, which is named as the Scanning and Localizing Model, rational
agents are constantly looking for resources to extract; therefore, they have
a behavioral rule to constantly scan the environment. On the other hand,
sustainable agents have a behavioral rule to turn towards the closest resource
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mountain and continue extracting around that mountain throughout
their life cycles without seeking other resources. As it can be seen from
Figure 5, while rationals are scattered around the environment looking for
resources, sustainables are extracting locally; green groups are on the resource
mountains while red agents are scattered around the environment. The graph
that calculates means tells us that with these behavior patterns, sustainables’
wealth generation capacity increases—the mean wealth of sustainables is
running close to the mean wealth of rationals compared to the mean gap in
the Two Breed Model.
In this behavioral model, the amount of resources in the environment
defines the winners and the losers. As Figure 5 displays, current percent-bestland of the model is 5%. What if the percent-best-land is decreased below
5%? Figure 6 demonstrates what would happen to these agents in a scenario
of decreasing resources. The agents that are satisfied with the resources of a
certain region generate more wealth compared to the agents that constantly
look for resources to extract.
One more behavior type can be tested in this model. As it can be seen
from Figure 5, the slider named ‘value’ was adjusted as 0 in the previous
test. This slider inserts a variable to the simulation, which is designed to
demonstrate the wealth generation effect when agents sacrifice from their
wealth towards the resource. The purpose of this variable is to represent people
who would invest or sacrifice from their wealth towards the activity that makes
their living. For instance, the income generating capacity of a farmer who
spends some of his annual income towards maintaining the fertility of his
land can be demonstrated in this model. The ‘value’ variable becomes active
when it is plugged in to the extract code of the model.33 This variable is only
applied to sustainables because this behavior pattern was thought to be more
prevalent among people who make their livings by environmental means,
such as farming or fishing. When the ‘value’ variable starts functioning,
sustainable agents start sacrificing some of the resources that they extract
from the environment back to its origin rather than transforming it into
personal wealth. For example, if the ‘value’ slider is adjusted to 50%, then
the sustainable agents will start extracting only with half of their extracting
capacity. A sustainable with a rationality score 4 will start extracting level 2
instead of a 4, leaving half of what it can extract at the resource.
When experimented with the ‘value’ variable, the first impact was a clear
fall in the overall wealth generated by sustainables. However, this behavioral
pattern proved to be important when resource-growth-interval and percentbest-land is very low. In such a scenario, the sacrificing behavior of sustainables
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keeps this breed alive longer than rationals. In other words, when there are
scarce resources, due to the sacrificing behavior, sustainables survive longer
than rationals.
The final variable that will be presented in the analysis is called ‘greed’.
In this version of the model, a new behavioral pattern related to the rational
agents will be tested. As it was mentioned earlier, rationals already have higher
levels of rationality scores in the models to reflect their higher desire to extract
resources for the sake of maximizing their immediate interests. However,
what would happen if we could manipulate the expectation level of rationals?
This is actually possible with a small twist in the code. In this version of the
model both breeds have a simple but very efficient rule to calculate and locate
the best resource amount around them. The code group that lets the agents
behave with this rule is called ‘turn-toward-resource’. Every agent looks to
four directions (north, east, south, and west) and makes a simple calculation
comparing all the resource levels in those directions - including the spot that
each one is standing at - and gives a decision to move or not to move towards
the best resource. By inserting a variable in the turn-toward-resource code of
rationals, it is possible to define the minimum resource units that these agents
are looking for. In other words, the higher the level of greed, the higher the
resource level that rationals will be looking for. The maximum resource level
(max-resource) in one patch is adjusted in the code as 50. When the greed
level is increased over 50 (higher than the maximum resource level set in the
model), we observe a scanning behavior from the rationals – not stopping on
any resource mountain but constantly scanning the environment. Because no
resource mountain is satisfactory for them to stop by; they just extract from
the resources on their ways. However, the more we decrease the level of greed,
the more we observe rational agents settling down in resource mountains.
This behavior pattern with greed directly influences the resource extraction
and wealth generation of rationals. It is observed that some level of greed
helps rational agents to generate wealth efficiently; however, when a certain
threshold of greed is passed, rational agents lose their resource extraction
efficiency. As it can be seen from Figure 7, when greed level is adjusted to 30,
rationals’ resource generation competence falls behind sustainables’ wealth
generation capability.
The Greed Model is tested in BehaviorSpace to understand the influence
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of greed with other factors. The following parameters are inserted to
BehaviorSpace in NetLogo for experimentation:
initial-sustainables:

100
100
rationals-move: 50
sustainables-move: 50
num-resource-grown: 1, 5, 10
greed: 1, 50, 100
percent-best-land: 1, 3, 5
resource-growth-interval: 1, 5, 10
initial-rationals:

To test the combination of all these parameters, BehaviorSpace runs
slightly more than 800 simulations. The analysis output is presented in Table
2, Graph 1, Graph 2, and Graph 3. The results display the percent-best-land
level of 1 under the categories of greed 1, 50, and 100. In Table 2, rows
show three different levels of resource-growth-interval under the categories of
greed. The columns exhibit number-resource-grown.
Every greed category on Table 2 is separately illustrated in the following
graphs. Additionally, in the Appendix section, the greed categories are
presented under the percent-best-land levels of 3 and 5 for further information.
The data parameters are all embedded in the graphs. As demonstrated in
Graph 1, there are three variables laid out in the x-axis. The very top layer
indicates the number of resources grown, which depicts the levels of 1, 5 and
10. In the middle layer, resource growth interval is shown. The bottom layer
is percent best land. For instance, Graph 1 tells us that when greed level is 1
and percent-best-land level is 1, sustainables end up with slightly more wealth
except in conditions where number-of-resource-grown is very low.
The results of the BehaviorSpace experiments that are exhibited through
Graph 1 and Graph 3, and through Graph 1a and Graph 3b in the Appendix
section demonstrate that greed and percent-best-land are critical factors
affecting the wealth generation capacity of the agents. According to the
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graphical demonstrations, rational agents manage to generate more wealth
in resource abundant scenarios. However, when the greed level of rational
actors is increased to 50, which is depicted in Graphs 2, 2a and 2b, the wealth
generating capability of rational actors falter. Unless percent-best-land is very
high (level 5), sustainable agents generate more wealth than rational actors
when the greed level is set to 50.
Similarly, when the greed level is increased to 100, rational agents lose
their wealth generating capacities even further (Graphs 3, 3a, and 3b).
Even in resource rich scenarios (percent-best-land=5), if the greed level is
at high levels, sustainable agents generate more wealth than rational agents.
Compared to the other variables, resource-growth-interval is a weak factor
with regard to comparing the two mindsets. Consequently, the higher the
level of greed, the lower the agents’ capacity to generate wealth.
The BehaviorSpace experiment results, portrayed through Graph 1 and
Graph 3, and Graph 1-a through Graph 3-b tell us that when agents only
seek to maximize self-interest and act individualistic, they actually end up
being worse off. There might be environmental conditions where instead
of being rational, having a sustainable mindset (being concerned about the
nature and resource depletion) will be more helpful to agents in terms of
generating wealth. In order to compare the performance of the two mindsets,
the BehaviorSpace experiment data can be arranged in a way to represent an
environmental degradation setting.
Let’s assume a scenario of resource depletion in the world. It is the year
around 2117. Due to climate change and pollution, there is little clean
water, air and soil resources. Degradation of environment and destruction of
ecosystem have limited the agricultural output in the world. As a result, in such
a scenario, people would face scarce resources - environmental limitations. The
BehaviorSpace test results are presented from high percent-best-land towards
lower percentages to create the impact of these environmental conditions.
The experimental data helps us understand the survival capacity of the agents
with rational mindset compared to the ones with sustainable mindset.
Graph 4 compares the wealth levels of rationals and sustainables under
depleting resources. The x-axis displays three layers of variables: the first layer
is number- resources-grown; the middle layer is percent-best-land; and there
is greed at the bottom. From the left towards the right-hand side of the graph,
number-resources-grown and percent-best-land decreases. In the left portion
of the graph, under greed level 1, rationals gather more wealth when the
resources are rich (number-resource-grown=10, percent-best-land=5 or 3).
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When the number-resource-grown falls to 5, sustainables always generate
more resources. However, both rationals’ and sustainables’ wealth drop
significantly when number-resource-grown falls to 1. In the middle portion
of Graph 4, which presents the results under the greed level 50, the overall
wealth generation capability of rationals decrease compared to level 1 greed.
Under the greed level 100, rationals lose their wealth generation capability
even further. Rising expectations too much in terms of resource extraction
turns out to be a negative trait for wealth generation. In the most extreme
resource depletion case, where both number-resource-grown and percentbest-land are at level 1, rationals accumulate slightly more wealth compared
to sustainables; however, both breeds can accumulate only little wealth that
they are equally on the verge of perishing.
The experimentation data indicate that in a resource depletion scenario,
the rational mindset does not always bring the highest level of utility.
Graph 4 presents 27 different environmental and behavioral combinations
to enact different cases. The rational mindset generates more wealth only
in 12 of these cases. On the other hand, the sustainable mindset produces
more wealth in 15 of these cases. On the left-hand side of the graph, it is
observed that rational agents obtain high yields when there are abundant
resources. However, once the resources start to deplete, sustainable agents
begin surpassing rational agents in terms of wealth. On the right-hand side
of the graph where the greed level is the highest, sustainable agents increase
the wealth gap with rational agents. The sustainable mindset generates steady
wealth throughout the cases compared to the rational mindset. The wealth
generation capability of the rational agents become unstable due to greed and
environmental conditions. All in all, in a scenario of resource depletion, the
likelihood of survival decreases for rational agents when their level of greed
increases.

Conclusion
This paper tested the basic understanding of rationality in a simulation
environment by utilizing agent-based modeling and introduced sustainability
as an advancement.
Rationality is considered as the central pillar of decision-making models,
and at the same time rationality has been defined in different ways throughout
the literature. Through simulation modeling, this study isolated specific
elements of this complex concept and explored basic notions of rationality.
The rational mindset, based on Hardin’s tragedy of the commons model
portraying the individualistic and self-interest seeking behavior, is compared
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with sustainable mindset. The sustainable mindset acknowledges the
limitations of environmental resources and act accordingly. While simulation
modeling is a methodological tool, it has the potential to design and represent
real-life phenomenon. Thus, the results from these models are compelling
and have potential to contribute to the understanding of rationality.
The various model results indicate that the rational mindset does
not always guarantee maximum utility. The simulation data reveal that
rational agents struggle generating wealth when environmental factors are
manipulated. Under the conditions of limited resources, the sustainable
agents proved to be more resilient. When the greed factor is introduced in the
simulation, the rational agents are further incapacitated to generate wealth.
Consequently, in a scenario of resource depletion, the chances of survival
decrease for the rational agents, and greed ends up aggravating their resource
extraction capability. Conversely, sustainable agents are capable of generating
steady wealth even if the environmental conditions are pressing.
Sustainability is not an alternative mindset to rationality, but a
development to it. A rational actor adapts to environmental boundaries
in order to minimize losses and maximize benefits. If an actor insists on
preserving an individualistic and self-interested mindset under conditions of
resource depletion, his wealth generation capability will be weakened and
his survival chances will decrease. A rational actor must adopt a sustainable
mindset when faced with environmental deterioration to increase the level of
utility and likelihood of survival under the new conditions.
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A – The NetLogo Code for the Basic Rationality Model
globals
[
max-resource
]
patches-own
[
resource-here
max-resource-here
]
turtles-own
[
age
wealth
rationality
learning-score
life-expectancy
metabolism
vision
]
to setup
ca
set max-resource 50
setup-patches
setup-turtles
reset-ticks
end
to setup-patches
ask patches
[set max-resource-here 0
if ( random-float 100.0) <= percent-best-land
[ set max-resource-here max-resource
set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
repeat 5
[ ask patches with [max-resource-here != 0]
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
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diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
repeat 10
[ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
ask patches
[ set resource-here floor resource-here
set max-resource-here resource-here
recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch
set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
set-default-shape turtles “person”
crt num-people
[ move-to one-of patches
set size 1.0
set-turtle-initial
set age random life-expectancy ]
recolor-turtles
end
to set-turtle-initial
set age 0
face one-of neighbors4
set life-expectancy life-expectancy-min +
random (life-expectancy-max - life-expectancy-min + 1)
set metabolism 1 + random metabolism-max
set wealth 0
set vision 1 + random max-vision
set rationality random-in-range 1 10
end
to recolor-turtles
let max-wealth max [wealth] of turtles
ask turtles
[ ifelse (wealth <= max-wealth / 3)
[ set color red ]
[ ifelse (wealth <= (max-wealth * 2 / 3 ))
[ set color green ]

Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

2017]

Advancing Rationality with Sustainability

[ set color blue ] ] ]
end
to go
ask turtles
[ turn-towards-resource ]
;;vision
extract
ask turtles
[ move-age-die ]
recolor-turtles
if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0
[ ask patches [ grow-resource ] ]
tick
end
to turn-towards-resource
set heading 0
let best-direction 0
let best-amount resource-ahead
set heading 90
if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 90
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading 180
if (resource-ahead > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 180
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading 270
if ( resource-ahead > best-amount)
[ set best-direction 270
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead
let total 0
let how-far 1
repeat vision
[ set total total + [resource-here] of patch-ahead how-far
set how-far how-far + 1 ]
report total
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end
to grow-resource
if (resource-here < max-resource-here)
[ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
if (resource-here > max-resource-here)
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
ask turtles
[ set wealth floor (wealth + rationality)]
ask turtles
[ set resource-here (resource-here - rationality)
recolor-patch]
ask turtles
[ if (resource-here < rationality) [set resource-here 0]
set wealth (wealth + resource-here)
recolor-patch]
end
to move-age-die
fd 1
set wealth (wealth - metabolism)
set age (age + 1)
if (wealth < 0) or (age >= life-expectancy)
[set-turtle-initial]
end
to-report random-in-range [low high]
report low + random (high - low + 1)
end

B – The NetLogo Code for the Two Breed Model
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ]
breed [ rationals rational ]
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth ]
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patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
ca
set max-resource 50
set min-resource 0
setup-patches
setup-turtles
reset-ticks
end
to setup-patches
ask patches
[ set max-resource-here 0
if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
[ set max-resource-here max-resource
set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
repeat 5
[ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
repeat 10
[ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
ask patches
[ set resource-here floor resource-here
set max-resource-here resource-here
recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch ;; WD
set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
create-sustainables initial-sustainables [
set color 65
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set rationality random 4 + 1
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]
create-rationals initial-rationals [
set color red
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set rationality random 5 + 5
]
end
to go
ask rationals
[ if (ceiling random-float 100.0)<= rationals-move [fd 1 ] ]
ask sustainables;;
[ if (ceiling random-float 100.0)<= sustainables-move [fd 1] ]
extract
ask patches [ grow-resource ]
tick
end
to extract
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality )]
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here ) ] recolor-patch]
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
[ set resource-here 0 ] recolor-patch]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + (rationality - rationality * (value
/ 100))) ]
[set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here )] recolor-patch ]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - (rationality rationality * (value / 100 ))) ]
[ set resource-here 0 ] recolor-patch]
end
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to grow-resource
if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
[ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
recolor-patch ]
end

C – The NetLogo Code for the
Scanning and Localizing Model
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource initial-wealth ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ]
breed [ rationals rational ]
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth age max-age]
patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
ca
set max-resource 50
setup-patches
setup-turtles
reset-ticks
end
to setup-patches
ask patches
[ set max-resource-here 0
if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
[ set max-resource-here max-resource
set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
repeat 5
[ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
repeat 10
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[ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
ask patches
[ set resource-here floor resource-here
set max-resource-here resource-here
recolor-patch ]
end
to recolor-patch
set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
create-sustainables initial-sustainables
[
move-to one-of patches
set color 65
set shape “person”
;;setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set-initial-turtle-vars
set rationality random 4 + 1 ]
create-rationals initial-rationals
[
move-to one-of patches
set color red
set shape “person”
;;setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set-initial-turtle-vars
set rationality random 5 + 5 ]
end
to set-initial-turtle-vars
set age 0
face one-of neighbors4
set max-age 100
set metabolism 1 + random 7
set wealth metabolism
set vision 1 + random 7
end
to go
ask sustainables
[ turn-toward-resource ]
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extract
ask sustainables
[ move-sustainables ]
ask rationals
[ move-rationals ]
ask patches [ grow-resource ]
;;ask turtles [ set age (age + 1) ]
if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0
[ask patches [grow-resource]]
tick
end
to turn-toward-resource
set heading 0
let best-direction 0
let best-amount resource-ahead
set heading 90
if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 90
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading 180
if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 180
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading 270
if ( resource-ahead > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 270
set best-amount resource-ahead ]
set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead
let total 0
let how-far 1
repeat vision
[ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
set how-far how-far + 1 ]
report total
end
to grow-resource
if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
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[ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality ) ]
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtleshere )) ]
recolor-patch]
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
[ set resource-here 0 ]
recolor-patch]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality)];; - rationality * (
value / 100 ))) ]
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtleshere)) ]
recolor-patch]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )];;rationality * (value / 100 )))]
[ set resource-here 0 ]
recolor-patch]
ask turtles [
ifelse show-wealth?
[ set label wealth ]
[ set label “” ]]
end
to move-sustainables
if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= sustainables-move [fd 1 ]
if sustainables-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
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to move-rationals
if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= rationals-move [fd 1 ]
if rationals-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end

D – The NetLogo Code for the Greed Model
globals [ resource max-resource min-resource initial-wealth ]
breed [ sustainables sustainable ]
breed [ rationals rational ]
turtles-own [ metabolism vision rationality wealth ]
patches-own [ resource-here max-resource-here ]
to setup
ca
set max-resource 50
setup-patches
setup-turtles
reset-ticks
end
to setup-patches
ask patches
[ set max-resource-here 0
if ( random-float 100.0 ) <= percent-best-land
[ set max-resource-here max-resource
set resource-here max-resource-here ]]
repeat 5
[ ask patches with [ max-resource-here != 0 ]
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
repeat 10
[ diffuse resource-here 0.25 ]
ask patches
[ set resource-here floor resource-here
set max-resource-here resource-here
recolor-patch ]
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end
to recolor-patch
set pcolor scale-color green resource-here 0 max-resource
end
to setup-turtles
create-sustainables initial-sustainables
[
move-to one-of patches
set color 65
set shape “person”
set-initial-turtle-vars
set rationality random 1 + 5 ]
create-rationals initial-rationals
[
move-to one-of patches
set color red
set shape “person”
set-initial-turtle-vars
set rationality random 5 + 5 ]
end
to set-initial-turtle-vars
face one-of neighbors4
set metabolism 1 + random 7
set wealth metabolism
set vision 1 + random 7
end
to go
ask sustainables
[ turn-toward-resource-t ]
ask rationals
[ turn-toward-resource-r ]
extract
ask sustainables
[ move-sustainables ]
ask rationals
[ move-rationals ]
ask patches [ grow-resource ]
if ticks mod resource-growth-interval = 0
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[ask patches [grow-resource]]
tick
end
to turn-toward-resource-r
set heading 0
let best-direction 0
let best-amount greed
set heading 90
if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 90
set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
set heading 180
if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 180
set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
set heading 270
if ( resource-ahead-r > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 270
set best-amount resource-ahead-r ]
set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead-r
let total 0
let how-far 1
repeat vision
[ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
set how-far how-far + 1 ]
report total
end
to turn-toward-resource-t
set heading 0
let best-direction 0
let best-amount resource-here
set heading 90
if ( resource-here > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 90
set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
set heading 180
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if ( resource-ahead-t > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 180
set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
set heading 270
if ( resource-ahead-t > best-amount )
[ set best-direction 270
set best-amount resource-ahead-t ]
set heading best-direction
end
to-report resource-ahead-t
let total 0
let how-far 1
repeat vision
[ set total total + [ resource-here ] of patch-ahead how-far
set how-far how-far + 1 ]
report total
end
to grow-resource
if ( resource-here < max-resource-here )
[ set resource-here resource-here + num-resource-grown
if ( resource-here > max-resource-here )
[ set resource-here max-resource-here ]
recolor-patch ]
end
to extract
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality ) ]
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtleshere )) ]
recolor-patch]
ask rationals [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )]
[ set resource-here 0 ]
recolor-patch]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
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[ set wealth floor ( wealth + rationality)];; - rationality * (
value / 100 ))) ]
[ set wealth floor ( wealth + resource-here / (count turtleshere)) ]
recolor-patch]
ask sustainables [
ifelse resource-here > 0 and resource-here >= rationality
[ set resource-here floor ( resource-here - rationality )];;rationality * (value / 100 )))]
[ set resource-here 0 ]
recolor-patch]
ask turtles [
ifelse show-wealth?
[ set label wealth ]
[ set label “” ]]
end
to move-sustainables
if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= sustainables-move [fd 1 ]
if sustainables-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
to move-rationals
if (ceiling random-float 100.0) <= rationals-move [fd 1]
if rationals-move = true [set wealth ( wealth - metabolism )]
end
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